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Whereof One Cannot Speak:
Legal Diversity and the Limits
of a Restatement of Conflict of Laws
PERRY DANE*
I.
How much can a Restatement of Conflicts say about the law of choice of law?
Several papers in this Symposium have addressed that question, though usually while
discussing the vague or uncertain state of choice of law today. I want to take a
different tack on the subject, focusing on analytic boundaries in the structure of
choice of law itself.
A legal system's impulse to tackle choice of law can take two different forms.' On
the one hand, it might reflect a forum's effort to rise above itself, so to speak, and
decide, by its own lights but from a neutral perch, which law properly applies to a
given issue in a jurisdictionally complex case. This view treats choice of law as a
second-order legal process, which is to say as a law about the division of legal
authority.2 On the other hand, choice of law might not arise out of a position of
neutrality at all. Instead, it might be an effort by a legal system (possibly but not
necessarily the forum) to work out its own substantive doctrine in the light of the
sheerfact ofjurisdictional complexity. This view treats choice of law as afirst-order
legal process.' It represents not the allocation of prescriptive (legislative)jurisdiction,
but its exercise.4
This dichotomy between asecond-order and afirst-order view of choice of law can
be a basis for categorizing entire choice-of-law theories. Crudely put, traditional
Vested Rights theory tended to see choice of law as a second-order process and at
least some modernist theories tended to see it as afirst-order problem.5 I want to put
the distinction betweenfirst-order and second-order choice of law to a different use
here, however. I want to suggest that any account of choice of law can include
variations on both these impulses, embedded one inside the other in interesting and
revealing ways. And I want to argue that, for both theoretical and practical reasons,
untangling the two levels of analysis is important. More particularly, a restatement
of choice of law, if it is done right, should be sensitive to the interplay between these
stances. For it is partly through such an understanding that such a restatement could
* Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Rutgers School of Law,
Camden.
1. The dichotomy I am drawing is similar, but not identical, to the familiar distinction
between "multilateral" and "unilateral" accounts ofchoice of law, which figures in some of the
other articles in this Symposium. To avoid confusion, I will stick to my own description and
terminology.
2. See Perry Dane, Conflict ofLaws, in A COMPANIONTOTHE PHILOSOPHY OF LAWAND
LEGAL THEORY 209, 210 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
3. See id. at 216-17, 219.
4. See id. at 210, 217.
5. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, " and Choice ofLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1191
(1987); see also Dane, supra note 2 (discussing several dimensions along which choice-of-law
theories differ).
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embody a more sophisticated sense of the limits on what it can say about choice of
law.
I could work out these abstractly put propositions in further analytic detail.6 For the
limited purposes of this Comment, however, I want instead to go on by way of
example.
One place to begin is the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws ("First
Restatement") treatment of the choice of law of marriage. This topic has come to life
again with the current debate over same-sex marriage. Rather than venture into that
debate directly, however, I want to dissect the Restatement's specific concerns.
The first rule in the First Restatement's discussion of marriage-and what appears
at first to be its fundamental rule-appears in section 121: "Except as stated in
[sections] 131 and 132, a marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the
marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are complied
with."8 This looks like one of the First Restatement's infamous act-territorial rules,
along the same lines as, say, its basic rules for contract and tort.9 But what about the
exceptions? The more important of the two sections referenced in section 121 is
section 132:1°
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party,
though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied
with, will be invalid everywhere in the following cases:
(a) polygamous marriage,
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their marriage
is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil,
(c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are at the
domicil regarded as odious,
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even
though celebrated in another state."
On a cursory reading, the import of this rule seems to be, that in the First
Restatement's second-order mapping of the world, prescriptive jurisdiction over
marriage is split, with the place of celebration governing most issues and the domicile
of the parties governing a small set of special situations, such as polygamy. A closer
look, however, reveals something different. For one thing, clause (d) of section 132
6. An article in the works does just that.
7. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT].
8. Id. § 121.
9. See id. § 332 ("The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect
of a promise with respect to" most matters); id. § 378 ("The law of the place of wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury."). By act-territorial, I mean what
most commentators refer to as territorial. As I have noted elsewhere, however, domicile-based
choice-of-law principles are also territorial in their way, except that rather than focusing on
where certain acts occurred, they focus on where certain persons came from. See Dane, supra
note 2, at 211.
10. See infra note 21 (briefly discussing section 131).
11. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 132.
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recognizes the power of a statute at the domicile to vetofor any reason a marriage
celebrated elsewhere. And considerthis sweeping language in the commentto section
132:
The rule stated in this Section recognizes the paramount interest of the
domiciliary state in the marital status....
Clauses (a), (b), and (c) state respects in which a marriage may offend the strong
policy of the domiciliary state. This statement, however, is not intended to be an
exclusive enumeration and if a marriage offends a strong policy of the domicil in
any other respect, such marriage will be invalid everywhere.' 2
The First Restatement, that is to say, does not merely contemplate that the domicile
has a potential veto over a well-defined subset of issues. It recognizes in the domicile
an absolute power, exercisable by statute or otherwise, to control for any reason the
validity of its people's marriages celebrated anywhere. Put another way, ifa marriage
of a domiciliary conducted outside the domicile is valid, it is only by the permission
of the domicile.'3
. This reading, in turn, requires a new look at section 121, which provides that, under
most circumstances, "a marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the
marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are complied
with."' 4 At first, section 121 had looked like a typical First Restatement rule-a
second-order, territorially based, allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction. In truth,
however, section 121 does not recognize in the place of celebration any independent
power to validate marriages.' Rather, it reflects thefirst-order substantive decision
of domicile states to recognize, by their own law, most marriages performed in
accordance with the law of the place of celebration.
16
Why would domiciles defer so? The, most obvious reason is for the sake of
simplicity, predictability, and the convenience of the parties. On the whole, it is
practical to let the prerequisites and formalities of marriage be handled by the place
where the marriage is celebrated. In general, a domicile probably cares more that
there be formalities than about their details.17 Moreover, most domiciles presumably
12.Id. § 132 cmts. a& b.
13. Whether the First Restatement's assignment of ultimate prescriptivejurisdiction to the
domicile accurately reflected American case law at the time, or the view of other
commentators, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
14. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 121.
15. It might recognize a separate power in the place of celebration to invalidate a marriage,
but that is a separate matter.
16. This point is stated much more clearly in Joseph Beale's treatise, which was published
around the same time as the First Restatement he took the lead in drafting. While the
Restatement begins with a general rule that looks act-territorial, and only raises the role of the
domicile by way of an exception to that general rule, the treatise much more clearly begins by
declaring that the domiciles of the husband and wife are "regarded as having the jurisdiction
to establish the marriage relation." 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 121.2, at 667 (1935). Thus, because either state can "create or refuse to create the
status of marriage. . . , the most important inquiry in the case of a disputed marriage is,
therefore, 'What is the law of the domicil of the parties on this point?' Id. at 668.
17. This is also reflected in the domestic marriage statutes of most states in the United
2000)
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prefer to "sustain marriages, not to upset them."' 8 But in the scheme of the First
Restatement, a domicile remains free-in.marriage, but not tort or contract-to
exercise its own prescriptive jurisdiction whenever it cares enough to do so.
Seen in this light, some of the apparent contradictions in the First Restatement's
treatment of marriage dissolve. For example, section 129 provides that a marriage
will not be invalid solely because "the parties to the marriage went to [another] state
in order to evade the requirements of the law of their domicil."' 9 But the comment to
section 129, and even more definitively a comment to section 132, make clear that
a statute in the domicile, such as the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, can, either
expressly or as interpreted, invalidate such marriages, not only in the domicile, but
"everywhere."2 There is no real inconsistency, however, because section 129, rather
than stating a broad principle freeing "evading" parties from the grip of their
domicile, is merely an interpretive canon as to the meaning of the law of the domicile.
This clarification, however, also suggests a problem with the First Restatement's
formula. For if section 129 is only a canon for interpreting the domicile's municipal
law, then what business is it of the Restatement to provide such a canon? Admittedly,
this piece of municipal law concerns an extra-territorial event, but it is still a
first-order piece of law: the domicile's effort to respond, from its own point of view,
to the fact of territorial complexity. And because the First Restatement generally
embodies a theory of choice of law as a second-order enterprise, for it to include such
a first-order canon of construction without a warning label is misleading and
overreaching.2'
States, which typically allow the parties a wide range of options-both secular and
religious-for formalizing their marriages.
18. Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329, 332 (E.D. Tenn. 1949).
19. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 129.
20. Id. § 132 cmt. e.
21. A similar problem infects section 131, the other stated exception to section 121. Section
131 provides that:
If by statute each party to a divorce granted in the state is forbidden for a certain
time or during the life of the other party, to marry again, and one party goes into
another state and marries, being permitted to do so by the law of that state, the
marriage is valid everywhere, even in the state where the divorce was granted,
unless ... the statute which forbids the parties to marry is interpreted as being
applicable to the marriage of domiciliaries in another state.
Id. § 131. This section, by its own terms, merely states a default rule for the interpretation of
a statute at the domicil. See id. at § 131 cmt. a. But what business is it of a choice-of-law
regime to interpret a statute? There is, interestingly, a genuine second-order rule lurking in the
discussion: such disabling statutes, the Restatement proposes, are only effective as long as a
party remains domiciled in the state that granted the divorce. See id. But this important idea,
which does go to a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction, is buried in the Restatement comment.
See id.
A more mysterious, related, provision is section 130, which denies even potential
extra-territorial effect to divorce decrees disabling only one party from remarrying (as opposed
to statutes disabling both parties, whose effect is recognized in section 131). See id. §§ 130,
131. But, as I discuss below, there is no reason for a second-order choice-of-law regime to care
whether a legal system exercises its prescriptive jurisdiction through statutes or judicial
decrees. See infra text accompanying note 23.
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More generally, this analysis suggests that section 132 itself (the broader rule
governing marriages contrary to the law ofthe domicile)' is both falsely precise and
analytically muddy. Consider again, for example, clause (d), which treats as invalid
"marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even though
celebrated in another state."' This formulation is arbitrarily narrow. If the point is to
recognize the "paramount interest" and authority of the domicile, why should it
matter whether the domicile exercises that authority by way of a statute rather than
ajudicial precedent or some other means?24
Of course, if the drafters had replaced the word "statute" in clause (d) with "legal
norm" or some other general term, that would have rendered clauses (a), (b), and (c)
superfluous. But that, in turn, reveals the pernicious confusion of those formulations.
Recall the litany: "(a) polygamous marriage, (b) incestuous marriage between
persons so closely related that their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of
the domicil, (c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are
at the domicil regarded as odious."2
Several problems are obvious here. First, if these categories do not constitute an
"exclusive enumeration,"'26 then the First Restatement is unnecessarily and
invidiously putting its imprimatur on three specific grounds of possible invalidity.
The inclusion of clause (c) is particularly malevolent, and not only because it now
appears so anachronistic.
Second, the specific terms of the three clauses are strange. Apparently, the law of
the domicile will invalidate a polygamous marriage without qualification, an
incestuous marriage only if it violates a "strong public policy of the domicil," and an
interracial marriage that the domicile regards as "odious."2 Moreover, while the
Restatement comment insists that "[w]hether a marriage comes within the rules stated
in clauses (a) and (b) is to be determined by the law of the domicil,"2 it applies a
distinct, oddly and atypically sociological, standard, to clause (c):
Whether a mixed marriage is so odious as to fall within clause (c) is to be
determined in view of the social customs of the domicil .... Such a marriage, to
22. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 132.
23. Id.
24. The drafters, in specifying statutes, undoubtedly had in mind case law that allowed
marriages to be invalidated on the basis of either natural law orpositive law, which is to say
statutes. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 99 N.E. 845, 848 (N.Y. 1912); Van Voorhis
v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 26 (1881); State v. Fenn, 92 P. 417,418 (Wash. 1907). But while a
particular legal system might choose to assign the task of interpreting natural law to courts and
the task of enacting positive law to legislatures, it seems beyond the purview of choice of law
to elevate that view into a universal principle. Moreover, since the drafters of the First
Restatement abandoned the term natural law, presumably to avoid its philosophical
ambiguities, it made little sense for them to retain, as a distinct category, the other half of the
natural law/positive law matched set.
25. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 132.
26. Id. § 132 cmt. b.
27. Id. § 132.




be odious as the word is used in this Section, must not only be prohibited by
statute but must offend a deep-rooted sense of morality predominant in the state.
29
But what justifies these distinctions? One might imagine some arcane set of
second-order divisions of prescriptive authority that defined, in minute detail, the
scope of a domicile's power to affect various specific types of marriages entered into
by its domiciliaries elsewhere. But, as noted, both clause (d) and the comments to
section 132 suggest a more general, undifferentiated, and unqualified allocation of
authority.3" Nothing in section 132, for example, would (much as we would hate it)
prevent a domicile that forbids interracial marriages from applying that law
extra-territorially even if it did not reflect "a deep-rooted sense of morality
predominant in the state."'" For that matter, the overall logic of section 132
suggests-contrary to the assumption of clause (a)-that a domicile in which
polygamy was illegal could, if it so willed, choose not to forbid its domiciliaries from
entering into a polygamous marriage elsewhere.
This discussion suggests, in turn, the deepest analytic problem with clauses (a), (b),
and (c). The First Restatement suggests that the common thread here is that "if a
marriage violates a particularly strong policy of the domicil of either party, it will be
invalid" everywhere.32 But whether or not a marriage "violates a particularly strong
policy of the domicil"33 is not really the question, at least not directly. The real issue,
as captured clearly only in clause (d), is whether the domicile chooses to apply a
particular restriction extraterritorially. A domicile might choose to do so, even if the
restriction did not rise to the level of reflecting a "particularly strong policy."34
Conversely, a domicile might choose to allow its domiciliaries an escape valve even
as to marriages that did violate its public policy.3"
29. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 132 cmt. c. This cryptic and unique formulation
is illuminated somewhat by the discussion in Joseph Beale's treatise:
If parties domiciled in a southern state leave the state and go to another state
which permits such a union, and are there married, the marriage is nevertheless
void by reason of this overwhelming policy of the domicil. If, on the other hand,
parties to such a marriage are domiciled in a northern state the marriage will be
held good in spite of a prohibition at the domicil. The difference lies in the
differing effect on the public mind in the two sections of the country. In the south
miscegenation is socially odious; in the north it is merely unwise.
2 BEALE, supra note 16, § 1.32.3, at 691 (footnotes omitted).
30. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 132(d) cmts. a-e.
31. Id. § 132 cmt. c. Of course, other principles, such as the norms of constitutional or
international human rights law, or even natural law as understood in the forum, might trump
such restrictions. But they would presumably (though not necessarily) trump them as much for
marriages performed at the domicile as for those performed elsewhere. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 132 cmt. a.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Israeli law, for example, because it makes no provision for purely secular marriage,
effectively bars a wedding, in Israel, between a Jew and a non-Jew. Nevertheless, Israel
recognizes civil marriages, including interfaith marriages, entered into by its domiciliaries
elsewhere. See Izhak Englard, The Relationship Between Religion and State in Israel, in
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If my argument so far stands, then Joseph Beale and his colleagues, in drafting at
least the black-letter rule of section 132, should really have said, simply if
tautologically, something like this:
A marriage which is against a legal norm of the state of domicil of either party,
though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied
with, will be invalid everywhere if that legal norm, explicitly or as interpreted,
makes the marriage void even though celebrated in another state.
Or, simpler yet, they could have begun their treatment with something like the
language in Beale's own treatise:
Since the domicil of a party to the marriage has jurisdiction to establish the
relation, it may create or refuse to create the status of marriage, and the most
important inquiry in the case of a disputed marriage is, therefore, "What is the law
of the domicil of the parties on this point?"36
That the First Restatement did not read this way has several explanations. The most
obvious, however, is that Beale and his colleagues were trying to do a few things at
once. First, they were setting out the abstract, second-order principle that the states
of domicile ultimately control parties' entitlement to marry. In addition, though, they
were trying to report, in the concrete, how domiciles operating in the common law
tradition tended to exercise that control. And, third, they were trying to discourage,
without actually proscribing, such control when it became, in the words that Beale
used in his treatise, "unsound," "selfish," and "exceptional."37
The problem here is not that the drafters of the First Restatement had several goals.
Every restatement has to maintain a balance between the theory and doctrine, and
between the descriptive and the prescriptive.38 The difficulty, however, arises out of
a complication peculiar to the effort to "restate" choice of law.
Publishing a restatement of choice of law is an ironic act. The project of all the
restatements, of torts and contracts and the rest, is partly to spur uniformity in the
law.39 But if the law ever truly became uniform, there would be no need for choice
of law, or for a restatement thereof. The solution to the paradox is that a restatement
of conflicts, even as it tries to build common ground on choice of law, must also
respect the lack of common ground elsewhere. It must, to be true to its own task,
assume that the other restatements will fail in their ambitions. Hence, a restatement
of choice of law needs to distinguish, carefully and rigorously, between choice of law
and municipal law. It can prescribe the former but not the latter.
What I have calledfirst-order choice of law-a legal system's effort to work out
its own substantive doctrine in the light ofjurisdictional complexity-occupies a gray
JEWISH LAW IN ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 168, 180 (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971).
36. 2 BEALE, supra note 16, § 121.2, at 668; see supra note 16.
37. 2 id. § 132.6, at 696-97.
38. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the
American Law Institute: The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 19; Clare Dalton, An
Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1005 (1985).




zone between municipal law and second-order choice of law. Nevertheless, to the
extent that first-order choice of law proceeds from the substantive concerns of
particular legal systems, a restatement of choice of law needs to treat suchfirst-order
questions with care and humility.
By overreaching in section 132, the First Restatement encouraged confusion in
both the short and the long term. In the short term, imagine yourself as ajudge in the
state of domicile. You want to defer to the best current learning on the rights-creating
power of other jurisdictions. But you also want to be faithful to your own state's
possibly idiosyncratic views of marriage. What do you make of section 132, and its
relation to section 121?
In the long term, the First Restatement blunted the import of its striking claim that
the domicile had ultimate prescriptive authority over the validity of a marriage.
Significantly, the First Restatement's section on marriage is one of the few in which
the drafters put aside their usual act-territorial focus and identified the domicile as the
definer of rights. Moreover, they justified their analysis with a notably
modem-sounding reference to the "interests" of the domicile.40 Nevertheless, the text
they wrote too easily reads as if it is only positing an "exception" to an essentially
act-territorial "rule."'" And the effect of that confusion continues to influence the
contemporary debate about the potential interstate recognition of same-sex
marriages.42
Now, it might be said, for both the short and the long term, that to encourage
domiciles to give up their peculiar or onerous views of marriage is a good thing. But
that brings me back to my basic point. Choice of law is about legal diversity. If there
is a felt need to reduce that diversity, that should be the task of another, substantive,
restatement, not this one.
I am not suggesting that the First Restatement should just have left matters with an
unparsed black-letter rule stating that the validity of a marriage is left to the law of
40. 1 do not warrant that they meant the same thing by "interests" as modernist authors do.
4 1. The Second Restatement gels this more limited view of the domicile's role by directing
the forum, not simply to construe and defer to the domicile's will regarding the validity of a
marriage, as the First Restatement does, but to subject that will to an objective test of
legitimacy and intensity. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTOF LAWS § 283 cmt.
k (1971) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT] ("The forum will apply its own legal principles
in determining whether a given policy is a strong one within the meaning of the present rule"),
with FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 132(d) (requiring deference to any statute of the
domicile that makes a marriage of domiciliaries ."void even though celebrated in another
state"), andid. § 132 cmt. c ("Whether a marriage comes within the rules stated in clauses (a)
and (b) is to be determined by the law of the domicil .... ).
The Second Restatement's black-letter rule reads as follows:
(I) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra, § 283.
42. I should emphasize that I have no ideological agenda in making this point.
[Vol. 75:511
LEGAL DIVERSITY
the domicile. To fail to note that, most of the time, domiciles do recognize marriages
valid under the law of the place of celebration would have been deceptive. In
particular, any treatment of the subject must record the sheer fact that most states, in
their first-order legal ordering, do not apply the full range of their local rules of
decision to marriages of their domiciliaries performed elsewhere. The trick, however,
is to distinguish, both betweenfirst-order and second-order choice-of-law rules, and
between factual generalization and analytic prescription. And the challenge is to




I have worked at length unpacking the First Restatement' s discussion of marriage,
but not because its errors are incurably damning. To the contrary, the bits of
confusion I have examined are relatively simple to pierce and the deeper immanent
logic of the Restatement's analysis is relatively easy to uncover. That is one reason
the example is so interesting and revealing.
To see a more acute analytic muddle at work, consider, for example, the Second
Restatement's treatment of choice-of-law clauses in contracts. Choice-of-law clauses
purport to require that a given jurisdiction's body of law apply to a contract. They
become difficult and controversial when their application would avoid what would
otherwise be a mandatory, unwaivable, restriction on the contract. Interestingly, the
division of opinion about the enforceablity of choice-of-law clauses does not track
the general split between "traditional" and "modernist" choice of law. Both Joseph
Beale-the great traditionalist-and Brainerd Currie-the radical
modernist-believed that choice-of-law clauses violated the sovereign prerogative of
the legal system whose law would otherwise apply.' The Second Restatement,
however, following in a line of more eclectic treatments of the subject, urged forums
43. In this respect, the drafters of the First Restatement might have profitably cribbed their
text from (gasp!) Corpus Juris:
The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the
place where it was contracted; if valid there it will be held valid everywhere, and
conversely if invalid by the lex loci contractus, it will be held invalid wherever
the question may arise. An exception to the general rule, however, is ordinarily
made in the case of marriages repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of
the parties, in respect of polygamy, incest, or miscegenation, or otherwise
contrary to its positive laws.
38 C.J. Marriage § 3, at 1276-77 (1925) (footnotes omitted), quoted inNg Suey Hi v. Weedin,
21 F.2d 801, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1927).
44. See 2 BEALE, supra note 16, § 332.2, at 1079-80; BRAINERD CURRIE, Conflict, Crisis
and Confusion in New York, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 690, 732-33
(1963); BRAINERD CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra, at 77, 103 [hereinafter CURRIE,
Married Women's Contracts].
2000]
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to show substantial deference to choice-of-law clauses, at least unless "application of
the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy" of the state
whose law would otherwise apply.
4
For present purposes, I am less interested in the exact contours of the Second
Restatement's rule than in its general rationale for enforcing choice-of-law clauses.
That rationale appears in an official comment:
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations of the
parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be their
rights and liabilities under the contract. These objectives may best be attained in
multistate transactions by letting the parties choose the law to govern the validity
of the contract and the rights created thereby. In this way, certainty and
predictability of result are most likely to be secured. Giving parties this power of
choice is also consistent with the fact that, in contrast to other areas of the law,
persons are free within broad limits to determine the nature of their contractual
obligations."
The problem with this reasoning is obvious.4" When the SecondRestatement purports
to describe the "prime objectives"48 of contract law, to which "contract law" is it
referring? Different systems and theories of contract law weigh party autonomy and
the protection of expectations to different degrees and in different ways against other
values. Moreover, the source of the controversy here is that one of the parties is
invoking a choice-of-law clause to avoid a rule of law-such as capacity or
consideration or the statute of frauds-that, in the legal system whose law would by
hypothesis otherwise govern the contract, generally overrides the stated expectations
of the parties.49
So which "contract law" is the Second Restatement talking about? I see four
possibilities. First, the Restatementmightbe invoking atruly trans-jurisdictional body
of law such as constitutional law, public international law, or even natural law. But
that seems doubtful.
Second, the Restatement might be looking to the state whose legal norm would
otherwise apply, claiming that even that state would, absent its own "fundamental
45. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 187(2)(b). The Second Restatement's rule
contains other qualifications not relevant to my discussion here.
Section 187(2) concerns issues that the parties could not have resolved by an "explicit
provision in their agreement directed to that issue," which is to say to issues involving
mandatory, otherwise unwaivable, rules. Id. § 187(2). Section 187(1) concerns the applicability
of choice-of-law clauses to issues that the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision,
which is to say to issues involving merely suppletory or gap-filling norms of contract law. See
id. § 187(1). Under those circumstances, it urges deference to the choice of the parties without
any of the qualifications contained in section 187(2). See id. My discussion here focuses on
the problem raised by section 187(2).
46. Id. § 187 cmt. e.
47. 1 put aside here the objection that "certainty and predictability," as such, would be
equally served without enforcing the parties' choice of law, if the prevailing choice-of-law rule
on which law would apply were sufficiently clear and specific.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 45.
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policy"5 to the contrary, choose to respect the parties' choice-of-law clause.
Enforcement of the choice-of-law clause would thus rest on the self-effacement of the
state whose law would otherwise apply, analogous to the domicile's deference in
questions of marriage to the law of the place of celebration as described in the First
Restatement." For the analogy to work, however, the SecondRestatement would also
have to recognize a power in the state whose law would otherwise apply not to allow
binding effect to the choice-of-law clause. The hitch is that the Second Restatement
specifically provides that, in determining whether a policy is "fuindamental," the
forum should look to "its own legal principles."52 That is to say, even if the state
whose law would otherwise apply would not enforce the choice-of-law clause, a
forum guided by the Second Restatement might.
This leaves the possibility that the values and "objectives" that the Second
Restatement invokes are, in some form, part of the law of the forum. Indeed, this does
appear to be what the Second Restatement drafters had in mind, as suggested, for
example, by their effort to rebut the objection that enforcing choice-of-law clauses
"would be tantamount to making legislators"53 of the parties:
There is nothing to prevent the forum from employing a choice-of-law rule which
provides that, subject to stated exceptions, the law of the state chosen by the
parties shall be applied to determine the validity of a contract and the rights
created thereby. The law of the state chosen by the parties is applied, not because
the parties themselves are legislators, but simply because this is the result
demanded by the choice-of-law rule of the forum. 4
But "the choice-of-law rule of the forum" can mean two different things. The Second
Restatement might be arguing that its view of choice-of-law clauses deserves to be
embedded in the forum's second-order account of the law of choice of law. Or it
might be looking to the forum'sfirst-order account of contract law in jurisdictionally
complex cases. Unfortunately, the Second Restatement' s discussion is opaque as to
which of these interpretations it has in mind. Moreover, both options have their
difficulties. As a second-order value of the forum, a duty to enforce the will of the
parties as a "prime objective[] of contract law"55 is too partisan, at least without
considerably more elaborate argument. 6 As afirst-order value, such a duty-for the
reasons I gave in my discussion ofmarriage-isjust not the business of a restatement
of conflicts, at least when it speaks in its most peremptory voice.
57
Again, I do not deny thatfirst-order choice-of-law norms are matters of legitimate
interest to any account of choice of law. Such norms, as I have emphasized, do
50. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 187(2)(b).
51. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 121.
52. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 187 cmt. g.
53. Id. § 187 cmt. e.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. I can imagine, for example, an appeal to legal pluralism and nonstate legal ordering.
But the Second Restatement explicitly rejected that sort of conceptual apparatus. See id.
57. I do not mean to suggest that there are no good arguments for the enforcement of
choice-of-law clauses. I actually believe that there are several such arguments that avoid the
pitfalls I have described, but they are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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occupy a gray zone between second-order analysis and pure municipal law. The
Second Restatement could, for example, usefully have discussed how different views
of contract law can suggest different views of the enforceability of choice-of-law
clauses. It might even have gently suggested that, to the extent that choice-of-law
clauses arise in situations of geographical complexity, a legal system-whether the
forum or the state whose law would otherwise apply-might see fit to revise or relax
the ordinary assumptions its contract law brings to bear in purely domestic cases. But
this would have required conclusions far more contingent than the drafters of the
SecondRestatement were interested in pronouncing. Instead, the SecondRestatement
engaged in a sleight of hand, dressing up first-order contract law values with the
prestige of second-order argumentation. It disrespected the very diversity of
substantive legal views that requires the existence of choice of law in the first place.
Some might say thit I am picking nits here. The Second Restatement is not a
statute. A forum that placed less substantive value than the Second Restatement does
on enforcing the expressed will of parties to a contract, even in jurisdictionally
complex cases, could just reject the Second Restatement' s rule on enforcing choice-
of-law clauses, whether it read that rule as first-order, second-order, or
fifth-dimensional. But this objection neglects the Restatement's normative position
in the legal culture, and its obligation of discursive integrity. It is not nitpicking to
imagine a forum seeking guidance on the larger legal community's modem views of
that forum's interjurisdictional responsibilities," but also wanting to stick to its own
restrictive or paternalistic guns on the substance of contract law, including contract
law in jurisdictionally complex situations. When ajudge in such ajurisdiction reads,
for example, that "the demands of certainty, predictability and convenience dictate
that, subject to some limitations, the parties should have power to choose the
applicable law,"59 what is she to think?
III.
I have devoted this Comment so far to examples from the First and Second
Restatements. That focus invites the argument, I suppose, that what I have to say, and
the analytic stance I have taken, would be of little relevance to at least some visions
of a possible third restatement.
Notice how, already, in discussing the Second Restatement's contract rule, I
suggested that the rule might reflect the Second Restatement' s view of the first-order
stance of the forum. This possibility necessarily implies a modernist take on choice
of law, in which the forum gives up the relative neutrality required by the traditional
approach of the First Restatement.6 And in at least some variations of the modernist
view, much of my language of "first-order" and "second-order" legal processes, and
58. See, e.g., Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992); Jacobson
v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1995); Schulke Radio Prods., Ltd. v.
Midwestern Broad. Co., 453 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio 1983).
59. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 187 cmt. e (emphasis added).
60. Recall that the First Restatement's treatment of marriage looked to thefirst-order
views, not of the forum, but of the domicile-which is to say the state with prescriptive




its invocation of neutrality, "interjurisdictional responsibilities," "rights-creating
power," "allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction," and the like, might seem pass6 or
incoherent.
This is not the place to revisit the debate between traditional and modernist
perspectives on choice of law.6 I will say, however, that the cautionary tales I have
been telling become even more relevant if we adopt a new restatement deeply
influenced by some variation on modernist choice-of-law theory. For if the basic
assumption of modernist choice of law is that all or most of the enterprise is really
what I have called a "first-order legal process,"'62 then itwouldbehoove a restatement
that took that assumption seriously to know whereof it should not speak.63
Consider, for example, the "interest analysis" of Brainerd Currie. Briefly put,
Currie's theory treated the "interests" of states as the prime variable in choice of
law.' 4 And he argued that, once a forum determined it had an interest in a case, it
should apply its own rules of decision, even if another state also had an interest of its
own.6" Currie's choice-of-law theory is open to serious external, jurisprudential,
challenge. But the most important internal critique is that Currie constantly made
unsupported and arbitrary generalizations about the nature and scope of the state
"interests" that he plugged into this choice-of-law methodology.' Moreover, he never
let on whether those generalizations reflected empirical obtuseness or unarticulated
and undefended normative assumptions.
67
61. 1 have in earlier writings described and defended my own variation on the assumptions
of traditional choice of law. See Dane, supra note 2; Dane, supra note 5.
62. Dane, supra note 2; see also WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 20-46 (1942).
63. Cf LUDWIG WrITGENsTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHELosoPnCus § 6.54, at 189(C.K.
Ogden ed. & trans., 1922) ("[H]e who understands [my propositions] finally recognizes them
as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak
throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions;
then he sees the world rightly. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.").
64. CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts, supranote 44, at 85, 117-18; BRAINERD CURRIE,
Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 44, at 128, 143-46.
65. See CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 44, at 119. ("The sensible and
clearly constitutional thing for any court to do, confronted with a true conflict of interests, is
to apply its own law ... simply because a court should never apply any other law except when
there is a good reason for doing so."). In later iterations of his views, Currie did explain that,
in determining whether it had an overriding reason to apply its own law in a situation of "true
conflict," a forum should strive for a "moderate and restrained interpretation" of its own
interests. Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,
759 (1963).
66. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980); Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest
Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1984).
67. See Brilmayer, supra note 66, at 402; see also Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest
Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 476-77 (1985) ("Interest
analysis generates the above foundational problems because it tries to do two inconsistent
things with the same conceptual test: to describe what states do want and to prescribe what
states may want. The first objective is descriptive, and the second is normative.") (emphasis
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In a deep sense, Currie ignored the fundamental point I ha'e been arguing in this
Comment: choice of law exists because of legal diversity, and a discourse in choice
of law needs to be careful and precise about how it seeks to mediate or transcend that
diversity. Currie could, of course, have made normative, second-order arguments.
But that would have contradicted his basic jurisprudential stance. He could have
made arguments grounded in transjurisdictional law. But that would have appealed
to him even less. Or, since he was writing law review articles rather than drafting a
restatement, he could have legitimately made honestly prescriptive first-order
arguments. But that would have required either a nuanced adaptation to the diversity
ofself-imaginings present in different actual legal systems, or affirmative substantive
arguments about the implications ofjurisdictional complexity that were sufficiently
general and compelling to transcend that diversity without erasing it. 8 Currie did not
pursue any of these paths.
To understand Currie's problem more precisely, consider that he did have
second-order views of a sort, at least if we relax my earlier assumption that second-
order choice of law is forum-neutral. In a sense, Currie's most abstract and general
propositions, such as "a court should never apply any other law [than its own] except
when there is a good reason for doing so,"'69 while not forum-neutral, did (as much
as a Legal Realist account could) allocate prescriptive authority-to the forum. In this
sense, every theory of choice of law, however modernist, must have at least a thin
frame of second-order analysis. Currie's quandary, however, was that his account did
not, and he did not want it to, invite a more genuinely robust second-order inquiry
into the meaning of "good reason."
Interestingly, Currie himself was skeptical of the possibility or utility of a
restatement of choice of law. When he did venture to suggest restatement-like
formulations of his views, they were pithy and skeletal, without any effort to hone in
particular areas of substantive legal doctrine." Here, Currie showed real insight.
in original). Some commentators have pointed out that Currie's descriptive/normative
confusion reflects a fallacy built into certain expressions of Legal Realism. See, e.g., Lea
Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 388 (1986).
68. By "general and compelling," I do not mean irrefutable; that would be setting the bar
far too high. A good deal of legal scholarship, after all, is normative, and we don't expect it
all to irrefutably demolish the premises of existing law. But I am trying to capture the peculiar
and difficult balance that a normative first-order choice-of-law argument would have to
maintain. On the one hand, it could not ground itself in an account of how prescriptive
jurisdiction is divided, or else it would be asecond-order argument, not afirst-order argument.
On the other hand, it could not just rely on the standard arguments about the ends and means
of contract law, tort law, family law, and the like, that are the tools of the rest of legal
scholarship, or else it would no longer be a choice-of-law argument premised on the fact of
legal diversity.
69. CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 44, at 119.
70. Currie's first such effort appeared in a 1959 article, and is worth quoting in full:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should be
expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in the law of
the forum.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the rule of
decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy
expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire whether the relation of
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Indeed, the lesson of his drafting exercises is a bracing one that others should take to
heart: a restatement grounded in certain variations of modernist choice of law, if it
were faithful to its own assumptions, would need to be very short.
That brings me, finally, to the suggestion of some participants in this Symposium
that the next restatement of choice of law, if there is to be one, should be forthrightly
substantive. Again, this is not the place to debate the virtues of a substantive law of
choice of law. I do wonder, however, how a substantive restatement of choice of law
can do its work while still respecting the legal diversity that calls for choice of law
in the first place.
Substantive arguments can, as I suggested earlier, be grounded in genuinely
transjurisdictional bodies of substantive law. But such resort to higher law is, in some
sense, not really doing choice of law at all. It is also conceivable that substantive
arguments could be grounded in a rigorous, if controversial, account of the scope of
prescriptive authority. Such an account might, for example, posit that the prescriptive
reach of any substantive norm of a legal system (beyond purely domestic cases) is
proportional to the justness, measured somehow, of that norm. But this sort of
argument is clearly not what many supporters ofasubstantive approach to choice of
law have in mind. They want to move beyond second-order andjurisdiction-selecting
rules entirely, and embrace instead a search for particular substantive justice in
multistate cases.7
But what sort of restatement would this approach require? It could, to be sure, be
essentially descriptive. But that does not seem worth the effort. Or, finally, such a
restatement could, I think, project one of the following two stances, or something
between:
the forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of
an interest in the application of that policy. This process is essentially the familiar
one of construction or interpretation. Just as we determine by that process how
a statute applies in time, and how it applies to marginal domestic situations, so we
may determine how it should be applied to cases involving foreign elements in
order to effectuate the legislative purpose.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed by the
foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest in the application of its
policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of its
policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of its
policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign state also
has an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a fortiori, it should
apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no such interest.
BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED
EsSAYS ONTHE CONFLICTOF LAWS, supra note 44, at 177, 183-84. He revised his formulation,
taking into account his evolving views, first in Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict ofLaws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1242 (1963),
and then in a statement prepared for Willis Reese's and Maurice Rosenberg's conflict-of-laws
casebook. WILLIS L.M. REESE& MAURICE ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS 487-88 (9th ed. 1990).




(1) Dear America: We do not believe that any purported, robust, second-order
account of the division of prescriptive jurisdiction can (with a few exceptions?)
satisfactorily decide choice-of-law questions. Rather, we believe that the
answers to most choice-of-law questions should arise out of the imperative to
do substantive justice in the special situation of multistate cases. We will spend
the next several hundred pages setting forth substantive rules of tort law,
contract law, family law, and so on, in contexts ofjurisdictional complexity. If
these rules do not reflect your own substantive views or priorities, including
views and priorities you have taken from the Restatements of Contracts, Torts,
and the like, we urge you to put aside those other views and priorities.
(2) Dear America: We do not believe that any purported, robust, second-order
account of the division of prescriptive jurisdiction can (with a few exceptions?)
satisfactorily decide choice-of-law questions. Rather, we believe that the
answers to most choice-of-law questions should arise out of the imperative to
do substantivejustice in the special situation ofmultistate cases. We will spend
the next few pages giving you an outline of what we mean, and how it might
work. We leave the rest to the unfolding development of the many diverse legal
systems in this country and world.
The first of these ideal types would look more like a conventional restatement. But
the second would, under these circumstances, be more honest and responsible, and
more attuned to the irony of the enterprise.
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